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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The end of President George W. Bush’s final year in office marked the end 
of the ‘ownership society’ policy program he championed at the end of his first 
term.1  The implosion of the secondary mortgage market has occasioned more 
than one obituary for this economic and civic ideal.2  Broad-based 
homeownership and participation in securities markets were supposed to 
promote greater economic engagement and empower the American middle 
class to build wealth.3  The dream of owning the place where you lived 
resonated with images of pride, security and, over much of the last decade or 
two, year-after-year of double-digit investment appreciation.  Far from being 
daunted by turn-of-the-millennium stock market sputterings, American 
investors, large and small, doubled-down and increased their real estate 
holdings through larger and more complex forms of leveraging.4 
It is ironic that the newly christened ‘ownership society’ should run 
aground because of irrational exuberance in home buying rather than in stock 
speculation.  Ownership of one’s own place in the world truly can offer the 
basis for community stakeholder status that those championing the ownership 
society claimed for all manner of financial investments. 5  Home is all about 
stability.  For more than fifty years, Americans have looked to their homes for 
stability in wealth as well as security of residential tenure.  The emphasis over 
the last decade, on the home as source of money, however, has displaced the 
in-kind benefits of homeownership and ultimately put them at risk. 
In the midst of this crisis in our understanding of homeownership, the 
movement to create a stock of permanently affordable homes poses a stark sign 
of contradiction.  During the last four decades, inclusionary zoning programs 
and Community Land Trusts (CLTs) have created and sustained homes that are 
affordable to not only the original low or moderate-income households that 
 
 1. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: 
America’s Ownership Society: Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html. 
 2. See, e.g., Jo Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, White House Philosophy 
Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at 1, 36, Zachary Karabell, End of the 
‘Ownership Society,’ NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 39. 
 3. See DEAN BAKER, PLUNDER AND BLUNDER: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BUBBLE 
ECONOMY 20, 84–85 (2008) (arguing that Federal government policy encouraging middle class 
speculative investment extends back to the Clinton Administration). 
 4. See generally DANIEL MCGINN, HOUSE LUST: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH OUR 
HOMES (2008). 
 5. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1939–41 (2005); 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2972–75 (2006) (contrasting two understandings of the “home as a 
castle” metaphor: “despotic dominion” and “inherent dignity.” Only the latter, he argues, reflects 
the proper balance of private and public needs with regard to land).  See also infra Part II.A. 
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move into them, but also to succeeding generations of income-qualified 
homebuyers as well.  While a general desire to make the tenure benefits of 
homeownership more generally available has encouraged these efforts, three 
different types of housing emergencies have necessitated the development of 
these long-term strategies for creating and sustaining permanently affordable 
homes.  First, inclusionary zoning programs designed to address 
socioeconomic inequities in the creation of new residential subdivisions have 
created resale-restricted homeownership units.6  Second, urban neighborhood 
CLTs have fought the displacement brought on by gentrification by preserving 
the affordability of low-income equity cooperatives and other affordable 
homes.7  Third, smaller cities and towns have used CLTs to create a stock of 
perpetually affordable single-family homes throughout their communities.8 
Some metropolitan housing markets have become so thoroughly 
unaffordable that communities cannot offer conveniently located homes for 
teachers, police officers, nurses or other essential professional and non-
professional workers.  While land use and housing subsidy policies that 
support multi-family rental projects are an important part of the local 
affordable housing response, affordable single-family homes must be available 
if theses communities wish to complete the workforce housing picture. 
In Montgomery County, Maryland, local officials harnessed a burgeoning 
private housing industry in the region and put it to work to build affordable 
homes both for rental and ownership.  In 1973, the local government instituted 
an inclusionary zoning system that required new housing developments of a 
certain density and size to include a small percentage of homes to be made 
available at below-market rates.9  This Moderately-Priced Dwelling Unit 
(MPDU) program not only created affordable homeownership opportunities 
but provided for their continued affordability.10  Rental units were required to 
be kept affordable for a period of twenty years, but it was not just landlords 
that were subject to affordability controls.11  Homeownership units were also 
protected.12  Homeowners promised when they chose to move, they would 
make their homes available to other income-qualified households.13 
 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 10–14. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 15–16. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 17–19. 
 9. See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and 
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 877, 914–15 (2006); Montgomery County Dep’t of 
Hous. and Cmty. Affairs, History of the MPDU Program in Montgomery County, 
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/dhctmpl.asp?url=/content/dhca/housing/housing_P/mpdu/
history.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Montgomery County]. 
 10. See Orfield, supra note 9, at 914–18; Montgomery County, supra note 9. 
 11. Orfield, supra note 9, at 915. 
 12. Homeowners buying these subsidized units make two types of enforceable promises 
designed to ensure the future affordability of housing.  First, they place a mortgage on the 
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In smaller, more community-based settings, housing advocates have used 
these same subsidy retention devices to sustain affordable homes built by non-
profit housing developers.  Twenty years ago, the then-fledgling Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) wanted to secure the permanence of the gains 
for which they were struggling and planning in their Boston neighborhood of 
Roxbury. Residents had witnessed the displacement and human devastation 
that urban renewal and gentrification had inflicted on nearby low-income 
communities.14  They wanted to revitalize their disinvested neighborhood 
without being forced out by skyrocketing land values.  In August 1988, they 
formed Dudley Neighbors, Inc., a community land trust that would hold title to 
the land underneath all the affordable housing and community space that DSNI 
was fighting to create.15 
Outside the metropolitan context, smaller, more isolated cities and towns 
with high land values and low wage bases have turned to the CLT model as a 
means of creating and sustaining economically diverse communities of choice.  
In Rochester, Minnesota, the Mayo Clinic sponsored the creation of the First 
Homes CLT to increase the homeownership opportunities available to a 
broader range of that area’s residents.16  Resort areas such as the Florida Keys 
and Jackson Hole, Wyoming have also seen the creation of these long-term 
stewards of non-profit homes.17 
Whether these homes are subsidized through exactions from developers (as 
with the inclusionary housing programs) or through public and private capital 
(as with CLTs), they are sustained through the legal arrangements made with 
homeowners that uniquely define the parameters of permanently affordable 
 
property that covers the difference between the home’s market price and the price they paid for it. 
This mortgage does not require any payments while the owner lives in the home and is released if 
the second promise is kept.  Subsidized homeowners can stay in the homes as long as they want 
but promise to pass their good deals on to another generation of qualifying households when they 
decide it is time to sell.  They promise to sell the property to the MPDU program itself or a family 
approved by it.  More importantly, they agree to sell it at a price calculated to give them fair 
return on their investment without putting the home out of reach for similarly situated 
homebuyers. See Montgomery County, supra note 9. 
 13. See id. (explaining that at first, the MPDU ordinance’s resale control period was only 5 
years, then in 1981, the resale period was extended prospectively to 10 years and that as of April 
2005, new MPDU homeownership units are subject to resale restrictions for 30 years). 
 14. ELISE M. BRIGHT, REVITALIZING AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN NEIGHBORHOODS: AN 
INVESTIGATION OF INNER CITY REVITALIZATION EFFORTS 77–78 (2000); PETER MEDOFF & 
HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 17–23 
(1994). 
 15. BRIGHT, supra note 14, at 81–82; MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 14, at 126–27. 
 16. First Homes: Rochester Area Found. Cmty. Land Trust (CLT), http://www.first 
homes.org/hot.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). 
 17. Jackson Hole Cmty. Hous. Trust, http://www.housingtrustjh.org (last visited Sept. 12, 
2009); Middle Keys Cmty. Land Trust, http://www.mkclt.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). 
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homeownership.18  In so doing, they offer a new take on the “ownership 
society,” one that challenges conventional social and legal notions of property 
in land.  By sharing the equity appreciation attributable to the continuing 
vitality of the surrounding community, participating homeowners enjoy the full 
in-kind benefits of homeownership and a stable, albeit capped, return on their 
financial investments. 
Even in the context of owning one’s own residence, the legal 
understanding of ownership has long embraced the right to no longer own—
that is, the right to sell.  The link forged between ownership and unfettered 
alienability brought down feudalism in the West and spawned a number of 
legal doctrines that continue to plague many first-year law students partial to 
the simplicity of freedom to contract.  The Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) 
invalidates contingent future interests that do not vest by the rule’s deadline.19  
Even if resale restrictions do not trigger this limited, but strict, prohibition, 
they must contend with a more nebulous common-law review as to the 
reasonability of restraints on alienation generally.20 
All of these organizations have placed subsidies into homes to benefit not 
only the original qualified homebuyers but successive generations of low and 
moderate-income households as well.  They sustain the affordability of 
homeownership in their communities not merely by collecting the subsidy 
back from sponsored households when they sell but also by ensuring that those 
subsidies can remain at those particular locations.  This dedication of specific 
parcels to perpetually affordable homeownership requires legally enforceable 
controls over who can purchase those properties and at what price. 
Several legal mechanisms control resales of subsidized homes so as to 
preserve affordability while still providing all aspects of ownership to the 
subsidized homeowner including a fair return on the homeowner’s own 
monetary investment.21  An argument could be made that, given the broad 
 
 18. Even in sustaining the long-term affordability of homes, CLT and IZ programs have 
differed in approach. Compare David M. Abromowitz, CLTs and Ground Leases, 1 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 5, 5–6 (1992) (stating CLTs have generally maintained an 
ongoing reversionary interest in the land upon which the affordable homes are built), with INST. 
FOR CMTY. ECON., COMMUNITY LAND TRUST LEGAL MANUAL (2d ed. 2002) (stating 
inclusionary zoning programs generally use covenants accompanying the deed to embody the 
subsidized homeowners’ resale promises. CLTs put these same provisions into a lease which 
gives the homeowner a 99-year term). 
 19. Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (1986) 
(quoting J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 19 (4th ed. 1942)) (“We start with 
Gray’s classic statement of the Rule: ‘No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later 
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.’”). 
 20. See generally 3 JOHN A. BORRON, JR., SIMES & SMITH: THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 
§§ 1111–1172  (3d ed. 2004) (explaining the rules restricting the creation of future interests 
including disabling restraints and forfeiture restraints). 
 21. Id. §§ 1111–1117, 1131.  See also discussion infra Parts III.A.1–2. 
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public policy considerations supporting affordable homeownership resale 
restrictions, statutes should be passed that make private or public permanent 
dedications of land to affordable homeownership beyond the reach of outdated 
doctrines of alienability.22  I will try to show in this Article, however, that the 
legal approach that made the market economy in land possible can, through 
moderate deference to the goals of permanent affordability, encourage a more 
nuanced approach to permanent affordability that is healthier and more 
sustainable than more simplistic approaches. Specifically, the conventional 
doctrinal hostility to “dead hand control” of land pushes those creating 
permanently affordable homes to provide for stewarding entities that will not 
merely enforce restrictions as originally written but also apply basic principles 
to make necessary adjustments to resale policies and ultimately act as a 
guarantor against fractionated title.   
This independent stewardship entity approach to resale control must be 
distinguished from three other alternatives.  First, private dedications of land to 
a social purpose threatened by market activity often stress permanence and 
inviolability to the total exclusion of flexibility.  Statutorily authorized 
conservation easements offer an example of, what I will call, the “lockbox” 
approach to land protection.23  An irrevocable decision is made to limit 
development of the land forever.  Second, the enactment of a particular set of 
resale restrictions on land can come directly from publicly enacted statutes and 
regulations.  This command-and-control mode of protecting the affordability of 
subsidized homes offers a high-level certainty of enforceability, but also raises 
concerns about the responsiveness of its enacted resale procedures to changing 
circumstances and individual situations.24  A third affordability protection 
alternative places the restrictions neither in the estate of the homeowner nor in 
public statutes and ordinances but in the development documents that create 
the community of which the affordable home is a part.25  This placement of 
stewardship authority, if not sole responsibility for protecting affordability, 
with a party that has landed interest is a significant step to the independent 
stewardship entity alternative that is the focus of the Article’s final Part. 
Both inclusionary zoning programs and CLTs are developing legal 
arrangements that balance responsiveness to changing circumstances with an 
immoveable commitment to the goods offered by permanently affordable 
homeownership.  At the core of these arrangements is a single legal device that 
embodies the essential facets of the stewardship approach to permanent 
 
 22. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 23. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 24. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 25. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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affordability: the pre-emptive option.26  Whether contained in an inclusionary 
zoning covenant or in a CLT ground lease, the inclusion of a pre-emptive 
option provides affordability stewards with an assignable right of first refusal 
on any attempt by the homeowner to sell the property.27  Most importantly, this 
ability to have the first opportunity to buy the property when the homeowner 
sells includes an agreement between the affordability steward and the 
homeowner as to the sale price.28 
As a restriction of the resale of real property, the pre-emptive option must 
contend with legal doctrines that are hostile to both perpetuities and alienation 
restraints.  Because the pre-emptive option, used to preserve long-term 
affordability, can affect a sale many decades after its creation, a lawyer who 
uses the device must be wary of the RAP.29  Since this type of right of first 
refusal acts to limit both the price and potential buyers for a property, it should 
be drafted to avoid any law, statutory or judge-made, that invalidates 
suspensions of or unreasonable restraints on alienation.30  As will be discussed 
further, the pre-emptive option responds to these challenges better than more 
direct restraints, public or private, on a homeowner’s right to sell because it 
provides for the continuing re-assertion of the steward’s relationship to the 
property.31 
Part II will articulate the goal of permanently affordable homeownership 
and set out the criteria for evaluating different resale restriction devices to 
achieve it. Part III will begin by articulating the reasons why a stewardship 
approach to restricting resale is superior to testamentary or regulatory 
approaches to sustaining the affordability of subsidized homes.  Part III will 
examine the pre-emptive option as the legal device of the stewardship 
approach and how it facilitates permanently affordable homeownership in a 
legal environment still hostile to long-term alienation restrictions that do not 
benefit particular landowners. Part IV concludes with an examination of how 
the IZ and CLT using pre-emptive options in covenants and leases 
respectively. 
 
 26. See infra Part III.B.3 (stating that the pre-emptive option is a right of first refusal that 
specifies the price at which the option holder can buy the property). 
 27. Abromowitz, supra note 18, at 6; INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-11–12-
13, 13-18–13-25; Moderately Priced Dwelling Units Declaration of Covenants For Sale 
Subdivisions, Art. II, http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/dhca/housing/housing_P/ 
mpdu/pdf/covenants_mpdu_sale_8-9-06.pdf [hereinafter Moderately Priced Dwelling Units]. 
 28. Abromowitz, supra note 18, at 6; INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-11–12-
13, 13-18–13-25;  Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 27, at art. II. 
 29. See infra Part III.A.2.  See also BORRON, JR., supra note 20, § 1222 (stating the RAP). 
 30. See infra Part III.A.1.  See also BORRON, JR., supra note 20, §§ 1111–12 (discussing 
what is a restraint on alienation). 
 31. See infra Part III.C. 
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II.  DEDICATION OF LAND TO PERMANENTLY AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP 
A. Why? The Goods of Homeownership 
Homeownership offers stability both in place and in wealth.  Socially, the 
stability of tenure associated with fee simple ownership of land forms a 
foundation for the household and the participation of its members in their 
immediate and larger communities.  Economically, the home, invariably its 
owner’s principal asset, is a tax-smart, conservative investment structured to 
encourage automatic saving.  Far from competing with one another, the 
economic and social aspects of stability fostered by homeownership 
complement each other strongly.  Although both the economic and social 
goods of homeownership are, to some extent, fortified by the ability of resident 
owners to buy and sell properties freely, the stability in tenure and wealth 
available through homeownership flows from durable rights to quiet enjoyment 
rather than its open-ended potential to yield a liquid cash return. 
Socially, the stability of tenure associated with fee simple ownership of 
land forms a foundation for the household and the participation of its members 
in their immediate and larger communities.  Proponents of expanding 
homeownership have argued that homeowners benefit from improved physical 
and psychological health and provide better educational environments for 
children in their households.  For decades, scholars have argued that 
homeowners have improved self-esteem and life satisfaction.32  Home 
purchase often involves the successful completion of financial goals. The 
recognition of these accomplishments by self and others would seem to 
contribute to self-esteem.  Even so, studies have not generally been able to 
demonstrate statistically significant increases in self-esteem that can 
specifically be attributed to homeownership.33  The correlation between 
homeownership and positive educational outcomes has been more promising 
even when controlling for a variety of other factors.34  These personal and 
 
 32. William M. Rohe et al., Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership, in LOW-INCOME 
HOMEOWNERSHIP:  EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 381, 386 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric 
S. Belsky eds., 2002) (quoting Robert M. Rakoff, Ideology in Everyday Life:  The Meaning of the 
House, 7 POL. & SOC’Y 85, 93 (1977)) [hereinafter Rohe et al., Social Benefits].  See generally 
William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The Effects of Homeownership:  On the Self-Esteem, 
Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of Low-Income People, 60 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 173 
(1994) [hereinafter Rohe & Stegman, Effects of Homeownership]. 
 33. Rohe et. al, Social Benefits, supra note 32, at 386; Rohe & Stegman, Effects of 
Homeownership, supra note 32, at 180–81.  Interestingly, improved physical health outcomes, 
although modest, are somewhat easier to demonstrate.  Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 32, 
at 388–89. 
 34. Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 32, at 398–99; Donald R. Haurin et al., Impact of 
Homeownership on Child Outcomes, in LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP:  EXAMINING THE 
UNEXAMINED GOAL, supra note 32, at 427, 429–440 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 
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household gains have spillover effects for the immediate and larger 
communities.35  There is reason to believe that happier and more self-confident 
household members will be more productive; this multiplication effect is even 
more evident with higher educational attainment.36 
Increased homeownership has more direct social benefits for 
neighborhoods, metropolitan areas and beyond.  The strength of communities, 
both large and, in particular, small, depend on the level of engagement by their 
members.  Homeowners have consistently made up a disproportionately large 
share of those participating in neighborhood organizations and local political 
activities.37  Because the values of their homes depend so greatly on the 
desirability of the neighborhoods in which they live, local issues dealing with 
crime, schools and municipal services have financial impacts that incentivize 
homeowners to pay attention to them.38  More interestingly, the increased 
attachment a homeowner has to his or her current place, both from the 
increased costs associated with moving as well as the security of tenure, fosters 
greater social involvement.39  Community tenure (that is, the hold that a 
resident has on his or her membership in his or her geographic community) 
encourages social involvement apart from the individualized financial return 
coming from public goods.40  The social capital that communities, both large 
and small, gain from homeownership comes from social and economic causes. 
The move from renter to homeowner status is not completely without risks, 
especially for low and moderate-income households.  Both the social and 
economic benefits of homeownership can be displaced completely by costs 
associated with mortgage default and foreclosure.  Although a tenant 
experiencing eviction can suffer loss of personal property and a security 
deposit, as well as damage to his or her credit rating, these harms can each be 
magnified for the homeowner facing the loss of investment and residence 
through foreclosure.  Even the positive health effects attributed to 
homeownership can give way to negative health outcomes caused by the stress 
of missed mortgage payments and foreclosure proceedings.  In financially 
desperate circumstances, a homeowner may have more leverage, resources, 
and, most importantly, time to respond to the imminent loss of the home and 
 
2002).  See generally Thomas  P. Boehm & Alan M. Schlottman, Does Home Ownership By 
Parents Have an Economic Impact on Their Children?, 8 J. HOUSING ECON. 217 (1999). 
 35. Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 32, at 400. 
 36. Id. at 390, 397. 
 37. Id. at 395–96. 
 38. Id. at 395. 
 39. Id. at 393–94. 
 40. See infra Part II.B. (discussing how this disentanglement of security of tenure from 
homeowner equity appreciation helps us appreciate how a limited equity form of homeownership 
can still encourage social investment by the homeowner). 
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can manage relocation than a similarly situated renter.41  While the dream of 
homeownership can, and for many recently has, become a financial nightmare, 
the increased security of tenure can have positive effects in difficult times as 
well. 
Many of the economic and social benefits of homeownership, both to 
homeowners and their communities, can be more precisely tied to the home as 
a financial investment.  The dependence of the home’s value on factors related 
to the community as a whole frequently draws the owner out of his or her 
castle to engage in collaborative activities that benefit all.42  It is difficult, 
however, to isolate this financial motivation for community involvement for 
the in-kind benefits the homeowner as a community member derives from an 
improved neighborhood and even from the participatory activities themselves.  
Nevertheless, with expanding homeownership opportunities through public 
subsidies, it is quite useful to understand more thoroughly how subsidy 
policies that offer both financial return and security of tenure in residential 
housing differ from those that offer less of the other or of both.  Before turning 
to the different kinds of homeownership subsidies, I will discuss another 
possible gain from homeownership subsidy, one critically relevant to the study 
of long-term resale restrictions: economic diversity among residents of a 
community. 
By supporting first-time home purchases by persons who would otherwise 
be unable to become homeowners, subsidy providers increase the number of 
people able to become homeowners generally.  Even when such subsidies go to 
persons who could buy a home, albeit a less expensive one, some of the social 
and economic benefits can be amplified by increasing the home and 
neighborhood choices available to them.  Both subsidy strategies usually 
increase the economic diversity, at least as to homeowners, of the communities 
these new homeowners join.43  The economic range of homeowners in such 
neighborhoods expands however slightly on the bottom end.44  In 
neighborhoods with very high homeownership rates, these additions will often 
increase the economic diversity of the neighborhood residents generally.45  
Even when renters receive a subsidy to buy a home in the area in which they 
 
 41. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2009). 
 42. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW U. L. REV. 1047 (2008) 
(pointing out that this dynamic is not always socially positive; the economic vulnerability 
homeowners have to local social and economic factors can create a heightened sense of anxiety in 
local politics that encourages insularity and even bigotry). 
 43. Orfield, supra note 9, at 915–16. 
 44. Id. at 910. 
 45. Id. at 917. 
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were already living, their assisted move to homeownership changes marginally 
the economic character of that community.46 
Economic diversity within communities has received greater attention in 
the last two decades as scholars of persistent poverty have turned their 
attention to the extreme concentration of poor people, especially African-
American poor people, that suburbanization has created in America’s inner 
cities.47  Although the policy recommendations that have flowed from such 
research have understandably focused on the strategic use of rental housing 
subsidies, homeownership subsidies also can be deployed to gain and secure 
the social benefits of greater economic diversity in neighborhoods and 
regions.48  The CLTs and inclusionary zoning programs that employ resale 
restrictions use housing subsidies in just this way.  As noted earlier, these 
community development tools have been particularly attractive to communities 
that would exclude important segments of the population from local 
homeownership or from residency altogether if not for long-term planning in 
the placement of subsidies.49 
Resale restrictions secure these economic diversity objectives of place-
based homeownership subsidy.  Before discussing how long-term controls on 
the transfer of privately owned homes balance these community goals with the 
other benefits that homeownership offers, it is worthwhile setting out the 
general categories of homeownership subsidies. 
B. Shared Equity Resident-Owned Housing as Achieving These Goods 
Subsidies, whether funded directly by taxpayers in government 
investments or indirectly through grants and loans offered by private 
nonprofits, supplement market forces to create opportunities not available 
through the conventional workings of supply and demand.  Housing subsidies 
can work on the demand side of the transaction or through its supply aspect.  
Demand-side subsidies, in the home purchase context, usually involve down 
payment and closing cost assistance.50  Homebuyers receive a pledge of 
 
 46. See id. at 893. 
 47. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51–55 (1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, 
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); 
PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 
(1997). 
 48. Orfield, supra note 9, at 931. 
 49. See supra Part II.A. 
 50. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of 
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 504 (2007).  See also 
Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis In Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues Requiring 
Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 475 (2004) (referring to Individual Development 
Accounts as subsidized savings program in which funds can be used for home purchase). 
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assistance and then go out into the market, find a home and purchase it at the 
market price using the financial help provided to close the affordability gap.51  
Supply-side support for low and moderate-income homeownership generally 
involves public funding for the creation of new and rehabilitated housing units 
that are sold at below-market prices to qualified buyers.52  Both demand and 
supply subsidies can support the financial and tenure security benefits of 
homeownership.  How heavily they both promote the former type of benefits 
may depend on the generosity of the recapture policy of the subsidy provider.53  
Most significant subsidies have to be paid back by the homeowner when the 
home is sold, but many such recapture provisions allow for the homeowner to 
retain the subsidy as cash if the homeowner has occupied the property for a 
certain number of years.54 
Examining the goods offered by homeownership subsidies, we see that 
many of these goods can be offered by both demand subsidies and supply 
subsidies.  Likewise, within supply subsidies, the personal and broader 
community advantages offered by demand subsidies can be promoted through 
all manner of supply subsidies.  However, the goods associated with sustained 
economic diversity are best secured through subsidy retention rather than 
subsidy recapture devices.55 
The goods of ‘Home as Place’ and ‘Home as Investment’ find themselves 
in tension in situations where land values have made ownership of an even a 
modest home unaffordable to median income households in the community.  In 
the regional context, workers that are vital to serving the needs of local 
residents are forced to live on the outer fringe of the metropolitan regions far 
from their urban workplaces.56  Inner-city neighborhoods are being torn apart 
as sudden shifts of disinvestment and gentrification cause residents to flee due 
to falling or rising housing prices.57  By separating to some extent the 
exchange value and use value of the home, inclusionary zoning programs and 
CLTs are facilitating and sustaining broader access to the stability, both social 
 
 51. In 2003, the American Dream Downpayment Act authorized federal use of HOME funds 
for downpayment assistance.  Salsich, Jr., supra note 50, at 504; Williams, supra note 50, at 475. 
 52. See BARRY G. JACOBS, HDR HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW, §§ 
4:72, 4:73 (2008). 
 53. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP:  THE CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE OF RESALE-RESTRICTED, OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 55 (2006), http://www.burl 
ingtonassociates.com/resources/archives/SharedEquityHome.pdf. 
 54. JACOBS, supra note 52, § 4:74 (discussing the amount of time required in home tied to 
amount of money provided in subsidy). 
 55. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 80–81. 
 56. JESSE MINTZ-ROTH, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., LONG-TERM 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING STRATEGIES IN HOT HOUSING MARKETS 3 (2008), http://www.nw.org/ 
network/pubs/catalog/documents/mintz-roth_fellowship_paper_05-08.pdf. 
 57. See James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
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and economic, that homeownership offers communities and their constituent 
households.58 
CLTs and most inclusionary zoning programs preserve the affordability of 
stable homes indefinitely.  They do so by keeping the subsidy that made the 
home affordable in place at same location through multiple generations of 
homeowners.  Housing policy commentators have labeled this strongly place-
based approach to subsidizing housing as subsidy retention.59  While it shares 
many important features with other approaches to long-term housing subsidies, 
subsidy retention can be best understood by examining how it differs from two 
approaches to affordable housing protection: rent regulation and subsidy 
recapture.  Like subsidy retention, both are—or, at least, can be—long-term in 
their approach to housing subsidy management.  Rent-regulation maintains 
place-based subsidy but does not deal with homeownership.  Subsidy recapture 
manages homeowner subsidies but does not necessarily maintain them in 
place. 
Basically, a homeownership subsidy retention device has two essential 
features that together preserve the availability of a subsidized property to 
future generations of eligible households.  First, it preserves the subsidy for 
continued investment in its original housing purpose, as opposed to allowing it 
to be converted to the recipient’s unrestricted private use.60 Second, it 
preserves that subsidy in-kind.  That is, it ensures that, when the property is 
resold, it will pass to another income-qualified household at a price that will be 
affordable to those eligible homebuyers.  Controlling the price will normally 
require not only claiming the subsidy originally invested but also limiting the 
equity appreciation—particularly, but not exclusively, the appreciation on the 
subsidy portion of the home’s market value—to make sure the subsidized 
homeowner’s investment gain does not put the property out of reach for the 
next generation of qualifying homebuyers. 
Rent regulation regimes such as New York City’s Rent Stabilization Code 
may not seem to have anything in common with inclusionary zoning or CLT 
programs.  Tenants, including those whose tenure rights are enshrined in 
statutes, are not homeowners in the typical sense.  They do not build up equity 
in their homes and generally cannot make alterations or improvements.61  On 
the ‘home as place’ side of the ledger, however, the similarities between a fee-
simple single-family home in Fort Lee, New Jersey and a rent-stabilized two-
bedroom apartment across the river in Manhattan are striking.  The statutory 
tenant can look to the apartment as his or her home indefinitely without fear 
 
 58. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 61–62. 
 59. Id. at 80–81. 
 60. Id. at 81.  This is also true of subsidy recapture mechanisms.  Id. at 82. 
 61. FERN FISHER & ANDREW SCHERER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN NEW 
YORK § 8:79 (2008). 
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that the landlord will simply not want to renew the lease.  Lease renewals are 
guaranteed by law, and the renewal rent increases are set by a local 
administrative process based on landlord costs.62  Statutory tenants facing 
eviction for nonpayment of rent are even afforded the same equity of 
redemption that homeowners seek to preserve in foreclosure proceedings.63  
Tenants can pass their leasehold rights onto family members who have shared 
the apartment with them.64 
If subsidy retention seeks stability of resident tenure, even across 
generations, rent regulation provides a powerful example of how price-
controlled housing can establish policies to promote it.  On the stable creation 
of wealth, however, rent regulation does not offer the same advantages as 
homeownership, even equity-limited homeownership.  While tenants are 
entitled to savings account interest on their security deposits,65 there is no 
significant investment steadily growing, by appreciation or loan amortization.  
More importantly, the renter misses out on the federal income tax subsidy on 
residential mortgage interest and property tax payments.66 
The comparison between subsidy recapture and subsidy retention is more 
straightforward.  Both usually involve a stated formula by which the owner’s 
return on his or her investment is calculated when he or she chooses to sell and 
move on.  The subsidy recapture provision may provide only for repayment of 
the actual subsidy plus nominal interest, but it can also use the same mortgage 
device to recoup some of the appreciation in market value during the 
homeowner’s occupancy.67 
The subsidy retention device invariably reserves for the subsidy provider a 
portion of the appreciation in the homeowner’s monetary investment, but, 
more significantly, it also keeps hold of the land. With respect to preserving 
the economic diversity of certain blocks or neighborhoods, specific parcels of 
land can be unique, even irreplaceable, goods.  Even if a silent second 
mortgage effectively recaptures the subsidy for those dedicated to preserving 
affordability, there may be no opportunity to reinvest that money in the target 
area.  By recycling the financial assistance in place, programs using the 
subsidy retention approach preserve footholds that earlier investments have 
gained in communities that are otherwise becoming increasingly exclusive.  
 
 62. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.5(g) (2009); FISHER & SCHERER, supra 
note 61, § 4:183. 
 63. 248 Sherman Avenue Corp. v. Coughlin, 222  N.Y.L.J. 13, 26 (1999). 
 64. § 2204.6(d) (discussing rent control succession); § 2523.5(b) (discussing rent 
stabilization succession); FISHER & SCHERER, supra note 61, § 4:205. 
 65. FISHER & SCHERER, supra note 61, § 2:26. 
 66. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 2009); § 164(a)(1). 
 67. Aaron Lewis, Affordable Real Estate Transactions, 20 PROB. & PROP. 56, 59 (2006). 
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Advocates of the subsidy retention device have shown how the maintenance of 
these forward-looking investments can pay large dividends into the future.68 
III.  TWO APPROACHES TO RESALE RESTRICTIONS: LOCKBOX AND 
STEWARDSHIP 
In order to make subsidized homes available to future qualified 
homebuyers, CLTs, inclusionary zoning programs and other affordability 
measures, stewards must have the legal power to control the resale of the 
property.  Ultimately, to meet the goals of subsidy retention, the property must 
end up in the hands of another income qualified household at a price that a 
family can afford, and the system that assures this must be able to replicate this 
result over the long-term. 
What sets different types of subsidy retention mechanisms apart from 
another, is not necessarily the apportionment of equity appreciation shared 
with a homeowner and appreciation retained with the property. This crucial 
policy decision can be made independently of the selection of the type of 
subsidy retention device to be used.69  Instead, they are differentiated by how 
they go about creating enforceable resale restrictions. The choice of how to 
keep the subsidy—as opposed to, how much of the subsidy to keep—with the 
land should be made in response to the current legal doctrines on alienability of 
real property as well as be guided by the policy decisions that do, or at least 
should, inform those doctrines. 
A. The Legal Challenges for Long-Term Resale Restrictions 
1. Restraints on Alienation 
Before classifying the overall approaches to resale restriction, our 
discussion would benefit with a brief review of the conventional classification 
of restraints on alienation. The placement of a particular resale restriction 
mechanism within a specific category of alienation restraints may have 
significant consequences for its enforceability. 
There are three types of direct restraints on alienability: disabling, 
forfeiture and promissory.70  All three straightforwardly prevent, or otherwise 
limit, the ability of a parcel’s owners to sell it to others.  A disabling restraint 
acts with particular directness in preventing property transfers; it purports to 
nullify all, or at least some, of the transfers made by the owner.71  A forfeiture 
restraint, on the other hand, causes the owner to lose his interest in the property 
 
 68. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 81. 
 69. The ease, however, with which a resale formula can be changed once established, does 
vary from one approach to another.  See infra Part III.A. 
 70. LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 237 (2d ed. 1966). 
 71. Id. 
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if he should try to sell or otherwise transfer, it.72  The forfeiture device could 
be in the form of either a reversionary interest retained by the party that 
imposed the condition as part of the original grant of title or a conditional grant 
to a third party.73  While both disabling and forfeiture restraints act to nullify 
violating grants to third parties, forfeiture provisions take the additional step of 
providing for contingent future interests in the subject property.74  Both of 
these blocks on alienability can be distinguished from an enforceable promise 
not to transfer the property. 
While the former two types of restraints use, or at least attempt to use, the 
doctrines of real property law to prevent subsequent transfers by the grantee 
that were objectionable in the eyes of the grantor, a promissory restraint uses 
principles of contract law to establish an obligation of the grantee to the 
grantor not to transfer the property in violation of the agreement.75  Since such 
a contractual promise involves unique property, the remedies for breach may 
include specific performance as well as money damages.76  Also, a promise 
that meets all the doctrinal requisites of covenants or equitable servitudes may 
‘run with the land’ and thereby be enforceable against subsequent owners of 
the property.77 
Some agreements governing the right to sell restrain alienation less directly 
or less completely.  A right of first refusal, for instance, may require an owner 
subject to it to take any offer to purchase his or her property to the holder of 
the right and afford them some opportunity to match the price in the offer.78  
Unless the time period for exercising the preemptive option is exceedingly 
long, most courts would not see this contractual arrangement as any significant 
restraint on the owner’s ability to sell his or her land.  The ordinary right of 
first refusal may well limit to whom the property will be transferred, but not 
the price or time at which it will be sold.79  As discussed below, if the 
preemptive right of purchase sets an option price that will require the owner to 
forego more attractive market-rate offers, then the preemptive option may be 
judged, and possibly invalidated, under the same criteria applied to direct 
 
 72. Id. at 238. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 279 (Both types of forfeiture restraints create future interests conditioned on the 
grantee’s failure to comply with the restraint on alienation.  The contingent future interest given 
to the third party is generally subject to the RAP.  The reversionary interest retained by the 
grantor is not the kind of future interest subject to RAP analysis.). 
 75. SIMES, supra note 70, at 238, 248. 
 76. Id. at 248. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Cf. Bernard Daskal, Note, Rights of First Refusal and the Package Deal, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 461, 461–62 (1995). 
 79. Id. 
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restraints on alienation.80  For the most part, these distinctions among the 
mechanisms by which alienation restraints act to prevent certain transfers 
affect but ultimately do not determine their enforceability under the common 
law doctrine against unreasonable restraints on alienation. 
In general, the validity of restraints on alienation is determined by 
reference to four factors.81  First, courts are somewhat more likely to enforce 
alienation restraints imposed by those using them to protect an interest in 
land.82  Second, the reasonability of a restraint on alienation will often depend 
on the duration of the restraint.83  Third, courts will look to the underlying 
purpose of the alienability restraint and weigh its importance against the 
general public policy favoring unfettered alienability of interests in land.84  
Fourth, the severity of the restraint will be measured by the probability of it 
preventing likely transfers.85 
In addition to these common law standards that strike a balance between 
alienability and competing goals, there are two types of statutes that express a 
similar legal hostility toward prior restraint on the marketability of land.  Many 
states also have statutory protections that ban outright those legal arrangements 
that completely deprive a landowner of the ability to transfer the property.86  
Another common-law doctrine, often codified in statute, creates an absolute 
bar on future interests that may interfere with alienation far into the future.  It 
is this fixture of law, the RAP, that merits our attention now. 
2. Perpetuities 
Resale restriction devices face another legal obstacle if they create what 
the law calls perpetuities.  Perpetuities are contingent future interests in 
property that may remain subject to contingencies far into the future.87  The 
RAP establishes a period of time, usually the span of a life in being at the time 
of the creation of the interest plus an additional 21 years, against which the 
remoteness of the vesting of the future interest must be judged.88  In the 
standard formulation of the Rule, if a contingent future interest may still be ‘up 
in the air’ at the end of the prescribed perpetuities period, than the future 
interest is void.89 
 
 80. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 406 (1944) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 80, § 406. 
 86. SIMES, supra note 70, at 264. 
 87. Id. at 263. 
 88. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1868. 
 89. SIMES, supra note 70, at 263. 
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Both the RAP and the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation 
promote the unfettered marketability of property.  Contingent future interests 
created by conditional grants, on the other hand, can create uncertainty in title 
that go beyond restraints on alienation.  One court has found that a right of first 
refusal can violate the RAP even if it does not present any burden on the 
alienability of the property.90  For the most part, however, these two doctrines 
have taken different approaches toward the same goal, making land available 
for voluntary transfer. 
The rule against unreasonable restraints of alienation impacts a broad 
variety of the types of direct and, sometimes, indirection alienability restraints 
described above.91 The RAP, on the other hand, impacts only those alienation 
restraints that create contingent future interests.92  Thus, disabling restraints, 
which may be judged with particular severity against general alienability 
doctrines, do not pose any perpetuities problems because they do not, as 
disabling restraints, involve creating new future interests in land.  The 
inclusion in a resale restriction mechanism of forfeiture restraints, however, 
does warrant awareness of the RAP. 
It might appear that any forfeiture provision that could deprive an owner of 
title at any point in time in the future would violate the Rule, in its basic form.  
The Rule, however, has been interpreted to limit different types of forfeiture 
restraints in different ways.  A restraint that purports to transfer ownership of 
the property to a third party in the event that the owner attempts to alienate his 
or her interest will be subjected to scrutiny under the Rule.93  Reversionary 
interests back to the original grantor that imposed the condition, however, are 
generally not considered to be future interests within the scope of the RAP.94  
Nevertheless, option contracts have been found to be subject to the RAP even 
when the option to purchase is held by the grantor.95  This, then, raises the 
question as to how indirect restraints, such as the preemptive option, should be 
treated under the RAP, especially when the holder of the option was the prior 
owner of the property.96 
 
 90. Ferrero Constr. v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 536 A.2d 1137, 1142–43 (Md. 1988). 
 91. SIMES, supra note 70, at 269. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 279. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 281; Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1908. 
 96. Preemptive options contained within leases and governance documents receive more 
favorable treatment as restraints on alienation and as possible perpetuities.  Thus, the modern 
development of these doctrines will remain relevant to discussion not only of the preemptive 
option generally but the different legal contexts in which such an option arrangement might be 
created.  See infra Part IV. 
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B. The Approaches to Long-Term Resale Restrictions 
The doctrines curbing restraints on alienation all express certain policy 
goals aimed at making the property more available to the market.  Subsidy 
retention focuses on segregating certain parcels of land from the conventional 
real estate market.  It does not follow, however, that every type of resale 
restriction conflicts with these rules favoring alienability in the same way. 
Moreover, attempts by permanent affordability advocates to accommodate 
legal alienability protections need not diminish the effectiveness of the subsidy 
retention programs they create.  Instead, an approach to conserving affordable 
homeownership over the long term should not merely evade the technical 
pitfalls created by these old rules but should engage the policy justifications 
behind them to increase the effectiveness of permanent affordability programs.  
Resale restrictions take three different legal modes of constraining behavior.  I 
will refer to these, in turn, as “Private Resale Lockbox,” “Public Resale 
Lockbox” and “Stewardship.” 
1. Private Resale Lockbox—Limited Title 
Since the subsidy retention approach to housing affordability is essentially 
an attempt to conserve land indefinitely for affordable homeownership, it is 
natural to look to the wilderness conservation movement for models as to how 
to secure the preservation over time.  The perpetual conservation easement 
offers the best example of a legal device that can be used to permanently, and 
almost irrevocably, sever development rights from ownership rights.  A 
donated conservation easement places the rights to “improve,” or otherwise 
disturb, pristine natural land into a trust, the heads of which are legally charged 
to make sure that the land is never developed.97  With other in-kind goods 
donated to other charities, charitable organization directors can decide to 
dispose of donated valuables as they believe will best meet the organization’s 
service goals.98  But conservation trust managers, under Internal Revenue 
Service regulations, have no power to trade or otherwise liquidate their 
easement assets for other goods, including other easements, that they judge to 
be more valuable to their overall mission.99  The irrevocability of the donation 
of a perpetual conservation easement expresses the idea of natural conservation 
as an unquestionable, almost eternal, good.  Some commentators have 
questioned the lack of flexibility in conservation easements and recommended 
 
 97. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 439 (2005); Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of 
Private Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public 
Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1044–45 (2007). 
 98. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 187 (9th ed. 2007). 
 99. A conservation easement can be transferred only from one qualified steward to another.  
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(2) (2008). 
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doctrines that facilitate appropriate modification.100  Some advocates of 
conservation, however, have fought for the development of the conservation 
mechanism101 precisely because of its resistance to any accommodation or 
compromise.  The idea of a lockbox102 is designed to address certain goods 
against apparently irresistible forces.  By forever placing the legal power to 
develop a particular parcel of land, three parties—the property owner, the 
nonprofit land trust and the Internal Revenue Service—are making a resource 
allocation decision that will bind all future generations. 
In the context of affordable housing, it may seem tempting to claim that 
the same market forces that lead to the exploitation and permanent loss of 
wilderness inevitably threaten and overcome well-intentioned plans to create 
affordable housing.  Even if a “lockbox” can be appropriate for the 
conservation of natural areas, or even farmland, there are at least two 
differences that set the preservation of affordable homeownership apart.  First, 
the geographic context in which affordable homeownership operates is much 
more subject to change than the idyllic settings that make conservation 
easements relevant.103  As important as housing and its affordability are in 
general, the irreversible decision to dedicate land to that particular purpose 
presupposes a foresight that the constantly shifting metropolitan reality does 
not permit.  Second, the conservation world has been able to sever the 
problematic development rights from the rest of the bundle of sticks without 
interfering with the transferability of those other aspects of title. Affordable 
homeownership involves not only a particular land use but also dictates the 
price of transfer and the economic characteristics of appropriate buyers.  The 
creation of a limited estate in which the homeowner can transfer the property 
only to certain persons bears some similarities to the fee tail arrangement. The 
need to pass affordable homeownership opportunities to qualified households 
at an affordable price does not lend itself to a “set-it-and-forget-it” approach to 
stewardship.104 
In reality, the limited title approach to perpetually affordable 
homeownership has not been widely adopted.  In its simplest form, the 
 
 100. McLaughlin, supra note 97, at 424–25; Korngold, supra note 97, at 1042–43. 
 101. The common law does not support the enforceability of servitudes in gross.  Most 
conservation easements rely on state statutes based on the Model Conservation Easement Act 
developed in the early 1980’s. 
 102. The term “lockbox” was used by then Vice-President Al Gore during his presidential 
campaign to describe his solution for ensuring the viability of the Social Security system.  
Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore Participate in Presidential Debate 
Commission Debate (Oct. 3, 2000), 2000 WL 1466168 (F.D.C.H.) (corrected copy). 
 103. See Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors 
French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1413–14 (1982); Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight 
and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 966 (1988). 
 104. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 69–70. 
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affordable homeowner “lockbox” could involve a deed restriction that imposes 
a disabling or forfeiture restraint on the abilities of the homeowner both to sell 
to anyone at a price higher than the amount set in the resale cap formula and to 
transfer title to any household that did not meet a certain economic profile.  Of 
all the affordability approaches considered in this Article, the doctrines against 
unreasonable restraint on alienation would be most severe on such a direct 
assault on the homeowner’s ability to transfer, especially when the party 
imposing the restriction might not have any continuing relationship the land, 
the homeowner, or future buyers whom might themselves subject to the same 
conditions.105 
2. Public Resale Lockbox—Command and Control Regulation 
For the most part, the law’s hostility toward alienation restraints and 
perpetuities appears in the common law and statutes.106  The RAP appears in 
several state constitutions, but a general prohibition against alienation 
restraints is not usually found at the constitutional level.107  Thus, one possible 
solution to securing the affordability of subsidized homes indefinitely might be 
to enact a law at the state level that governs the resales of the properties subject 
to it.108  Although the conservation land trust movement has also embraced this 
command-and-control approach, the strongest example comes from the world 
of affordable housing.  Rent regulation systems take a strong command and 
control approach to preserving affordability in private rental markets. 
New York’s twin systems of rent regulation show how command-and-
control systems can regulate affordability.  Rent stabilization is a lease-based 
approach to statutory tenancies.109  Landlords and tenants in buildings subject 
to the Rent Stabilization Law and Code set the specific terms of their tenancies 
subject to certain generic tenant protection laws.110  The Rent Stabilization 
Code focuses primarily on capping the maximum rent that can be charge for 
the regulated unit.  Legal rents are determined by the unit’s rent history as 
affected by the guideline and other rent increases that the rent stabilization 
 
 105. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 106. See SIMES, supra note 70, at 237. 
 107. But see, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19 (elevating the RAP to the constitutional level); 
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34 (elevating the RAP to the constitutional level); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 
32; N.M.  CONST. art. IV §§ 26, 38 (elevating the RAP to the constitutional level).  See also DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (2009) (RAP does not apply to wills and trusts); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
46:2F-9 (West 2003) (abolishing the RAP); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-6-3 (2004) (abolished the 
RAP); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-1522 (2007) (abolishing the RAP). 
 108. The Maryland General Assembly is currently considering legislation that would do just 
this. 
 109. See infra notes 111–14. 
 110. These laws are not different in kind from those in cities without rent regulation. FISHER 
& SCHERER, supra note 61, § 4:1. 
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administrative apparatus has sanctioned.111  Unlike the long-term affordable 
homeownership programs, the rent stabilization system does not require that 
protected tenants fall within a narrow range of household incomes.112 The Rent 
Stabilization Law and Code devote a considerable amount of attention, 
however, to ensuring that the law protects only those tenants who maintain 
their units as their primary residences.113  Even though tenants are provided 
with access to information to help them enforce the rent caps and landlords are 
motivated to enforce primary residence restrictions by rent increase 
opportunities occasioned by tenant turnover, the rent regulation system in New 
York requires a vast and expensive bureaucracy that can be justified by the 
large percentage of New York City’s housing that is subject to it. 
In the context of permanently affordable homeownership, it is difficult to 
see how a one-size-fits-all system could be developed at the state level that 
would directly restrict resales of subsidized homes.  Most commentators who 
have advocated for statutory change in this area have focused on laws that 
provide some assurance that the private arrangements made between 
subsidized homeowner and sponsor are properly regulated and enforced.114  
Even when the statutes that sanction the enforceability of affordable housing 
resale restrictions also provide local governments with the authority to impose 
the terms through regulation rather than more private means, local programs 
have tended to rely on a hybrid form of land use control such as the statutory 
community association. 
3. Resale Stewardship: The Preemptive Option 
Thus far, we have considered, in turn, an indelible restriction created by a 
single grantor and a regulatory scheme imposed by the state or local 
government or both.  The first option simply defies the existing doctrines 
regarding perpetuities and restraints on alienation and is, therefore, vulnerable 
 
 111. Id. § 4:99. 
 112. A change in the Rent Stabilization Law permits landlords to charge market rents in 
excess of the legal rent to those tenants whose household income exceeds $175,000 per year and 
whose regulated rents already exceed $2,000 per month. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504.1. This 
deregulation provision is not the same as one requiring a landlord to rent a stabilized unit to a 
household with an income below that level. 
 113. Failure to maintain a rent stabilized apartment can be grounds for eviction or non-
renewal of the lease. FISHER & SCHERER, supra note 61, § 8:206.  Subleasing is strictly limited. 
Id. § 8:162. 
 114. See, e.g., Christopher A. Seeger, Note, The Fixed-Price Preemptive Right in the CLT 
Lease: A Valid Response to the Housing Crisis or an Invalid Restraint on Alienation?, 11 
CARDOZO L. REV. 471 (1989).  But see, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating 
Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543, 546 (2006) (proposing zoning 
ordinance amendment that severely restricts resale of residential property for first three years of 
ownership). 
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to judicial invalidation.  The command-and-control approach, already 
dependent on statutory enactment, enjoys the ability to simply trump the 
doctrines that make structuring the conservation of affordable homeownership 
so challenging.  An alternative approach to resale control, however, may 
accommodate these market-oriented real estate doctrines and produce legal 
devices for preserving homeownership subsidies in place that are direct, clear 
and legally enforceable. 
Rather than privately or publicly deprive the homeowner of the permanent 
ability to sell his or her home on the open market to the highest bidder, legal 
arrangements can be made at the time of the original home purchase to ensure 
that an entity committed to preserving the affordability of the property has the 
option of buying the home at a calculated resale price and insuring its transfer 
to a qualified buyer.  This option on the property could be exercised only when 
the homeowner declares his or her intent to move from or sell the property.115  
Like a right of first refusal, it gives the stewardship entity the right to obtain 
the property when the owner is ready to sell.  Because the price is set by a 
formula already agreed to by the stewardship entity and the homeowner, the 
stewardship’s right to purchase is called a preemptive option. 
C. Why Stewardship is the Better Approach to Resale Restrictions 
Under the preemptive option approach to restricting resale, the only 
obstacle to full and free alienability depends on the affirmative action of the 
stewardship entity.  Generally, the period of time that the owner must wait to 
allow the option to be exercised is limited.116  From a process point of view, 
the burden on alienability is strictly limited. 
Depending on the legal vehicle for the preemptive option, the stewardship 
entity has an ongoing relationship with the land.  For options held by 
homeowners’ associations and cooperatives, the link exists by way of the other 
members’ interests in adjoining real property.  The CLT employing a ground 
lease has a direct reversionary interest in the land itself.  Courts hostile to 
alienation restraints held in gross can be assured that enforcement of these 
types of resale restrictions protect the steward’s ongoing interest in the 
property itself.117 
Those qualities that make the preemptive option attractive to courts and 
policy makers suspicious of dead hand control also require the stewardship 
entity to function as an attentive and committed guardian of affordability and 
other social values.  If the land trust or community association manager does 
not respond to a homeowner’s notice of intent to sell in a timely manner, the 
 
 115. INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-13. 
 116. Under the Revised Model Ground Lease, the CLT has 45 days from the receipt of the 
appraisal to exercise its option or the option expires. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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homeowner may be free of the subsidy retention, if not subsidy recapture, 
devices affecting resale.118  Given the fact that small community-based 
nonprofits perennially face financial challenges, the possibility that the 
stewardship might become dormant or cease to exist altogether must be 
considered when planning a resale stewardship system. 
The conservation movement has been drawn to the lockbox approach for 
protecting wilderness areas because they fear that vacillating political fortunes, 
in public and even private nonprofit land trusts, may lead to retractions of 
conservation commitments.  By securing an irreversible easement grant from 
the landowner, the conservation land trust appears to have eliminated the 
possibility that the land will ever be developed.119  For those who see the 
preservation of wilderness as an immutable good, the certainty of truly 
permanent dedication of land seems very attractive. 
Those dedicated to the availability of affordable homes may be no less 
passionate about the rightness of their cause.  Like environmental activists, 
they often see themselves standing against powerful institutions, both private 
and public, focused on market-generated gains.  Because residential 
affordability in neighborhoods requires constant attention, those committed to 
permanent affordability in housing hopefully recognize that a simplistic 
banning of all future market sales cannot guarantee the property remains a safe, 
decent and affordable home.120  Even if a stewardship relationship is supported 
by broader, self-executing curbs on the subsidized homeowner’s ability to sell 
on the open market, the need for an active steward that manages the need for 
change and monitors compliance cannot be ignored.121  Despite the fact that 
the stewardship approach to resale restrictions places the responsibility of 
protecting the ongoing affordability of the subsidized home on a single entity, 
it is better suited to the dynamics of residential real estate markets than the 
lockbox approach. 
 
 118. For this reason, it may be prudent for those community developers employing the 
preemptive option as the subsidy retention device to backstop it with a subsidy recapture 
mechanism such as a silent second mortgage.  This seemingly redundant structuring may take 
away any financial incentive the homeowner might have to evade or challenge his or her 
obligation to sell the property back to the stewardship entity. 
 119. I say “apparently” because there remains the prospect that the easement could be 
condemned in eminent domain proceedings. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 97. 
 120. See id. and accompanying text. 
 121. Given the possibility of stewardship organizational failure, pre-emptive options should 
be created to allow them to be exercised by back-up stewards, such as local housing agencies, in 
the event that the primary steward is unable to exercise them. 
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IV.  STEWARDSHIP FORMS: THE PREEMPTIVE OPTION IN GROUND LEASES AND 
COVENANTS 
The defined-price right of first refusal is the heart of the stewardship 
approach to retaining homeownership subsidies in place over the long-term.  
The choice of the pre-emptive option as the mechanism by which resale 
controls are actualized already gives the stewardship approach meaningful 
definition.  There are, however, several options as to how this particular 
promise by the homeowner to the stewardship entity can be memorialized.  
CLTs have made the preemptive option one of many provisions unique to the 
ground lease that establishes the relationship between a CLT and the supported 
homeowner.  Inclusionary zoning programs have taken advantage of the fact 
that their affordable units are created as part of a new housing development 
complete with its own set of covenants and community governance 
mechanism.  In addition to these two examples of long-term affordability 
stewardship relationships, there exists the possibility of the affordability 
promise existing as a stand-alone covenant between a fee simple homeowner 
and a stewardship entity that has no other direct relationship to the property 
protected. 
A. Preemptive Options in CLT Ground Leases 
Although ground leases are rarely used for small residential properties in 
most states,122 commercial ground leases have become indispensable in the 
development of shopping centers and malls.123  They have not only facilitated 
the financing of large projects created and monitored by specialized business 
enterprises, but they have also maintained the necessary coordination of 
investment among large and small retailers through alienability restrictions.124  
Even though commercial ground leasing focused more completely on the free 
market, anchor tenant leases that severely restrict the ability of these big-name 
retailers to assign or sublet their space to lesser stores are essential to building 
confidence in the community of smaller, satellite tenants by which a mall 
developer makes the bulk of its profits.  Although theoretically, a shopping 
 
 122. Maryland has a long history of ground leasing on single-family homes.  While 
Pennsylvania and Maryland both used ground leases through the 19th century, diverging legal 
treatment of the reversionary interests caused Pennsylvania’s system to fade while Maryland’s 
ground rent system became an important feature in the development of Baltimore’s turn-of-the-
century rowhouses.  In 1884, Maryland adopted a statutory measure that made ground leases on 
single-family homes redeemable, essentially relegating them to a financing device that could be 
fully amortized. MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 8-110 (West 2009). This has created unique 
challenges for using the ground lease mechanism to try to use ground leases to create perpetually 
affordable homeownership in Maryland. 
 123. See JEROME D. WHALEN, COMMERCIAL GROUND LEASES § 1:2 (2010). 
 124. See id. 
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center could be developed by granting full title for each store space to the 
retailer occupying it and using reciprocal covenants to manage the positive and 
negative spillover effects, the ground lease provides the flexibility and 
certainty of enforcement that is necessary to maintaining the community of 
businesses. 
In the context of permanently affordable homes, the CLT movement has 
championed the use of the ground lease for a variety of reasons.  Explaining 
that the home is not just as a “bundle of rights” but also a “bundle of values,” 
the CLT Legal Manual posits that the CLT approach of separating ownership 
of land and ownership of the improvements reflects the reality that while the 
homeowner is responsible for the value of his property to the extent it is 
impacted by the quality of the house on it, much of the owner’s equity depends 
on the desirability of the surrounding community as a place to live.  By giving 
the homeowner full title to the house while retaining a reversionary interest in 
the land beneath it, CLT proponents argue that they are restoring the natural 
balance of the private and communal values in the home.125 
CLT ground leases generally provide for a 99-year term, with at least one 
renewal at the option of the homeowner.126  Although the land trust 
homeowner does not have fee simple title to the land, the idea of the ground 
lease is to give the homeowner the same security of tenure that other 
homeowners enjoy.  The lease arrangement departs from fee simple transfers 
in the two areas that are critical to subsidy retention.  During the term of the 
lease, a leaseholder homeowner must commit to maintaining the property as 
his or her primary residence.  When the homeowner decides to move, the 
preemptive option on the improvements is triggered.  Nothing in the lease 
prevents leaseholder homeowners from staying in their homes as long as they 
wish.127 
These core requirements of primary residence commitment and resale 
restriction are common to all subsidy retention structures.  Differentiating the 
leasehold approach from the uses of covenants, therefore, involves three other 
areas: the differences to enforcement of resale restrictions; the differences in 
term-time questions such as property tax treatment and responses to nuisance 
and waste; and the consequences of the form choice for the goods associated 
with homeownership. 
 
 125. See generally Kirby White & Charles Matthei, Community Land Trusts, in BEYOND THE 
MARKET AND THE STATE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 41 (Severyn T. 
Bruyn & James Meehan eds., 1987). 
 126. Leases that provide for fixed terms that exceed 99-years are considered fee, rather than 
leasehold, transfers. Leases, both commercial and residential, that provide for very long-terms 
must be carefully structured to avoid recharacterization as mortgages or other financing devices. 
See Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
 127. Leasehold interests are generally inheritable pursuant to the terms of the lease. INST. FOR 
CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-12. 
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The stewardship approach generally has shown greater compatibility with 
existing law than the lockbox approach.  Focusing on the enforceability, 
unassisted by statutory reform, of the preemptive option, the land trust ground 
lease also has advantages to recommend itself.  As noted earlier, preemptive 
options acquired by transferors of the property are increasingly exempted from 
being subjected to the RAP.128  Likewise, the leasehold preemptive option 
offers compliance advantages with regard to the rule against unreasonable 
restraints on alienation.  The CLT’s reversion creates the strongest stewardship 
relationship for restricting resales.  Because the land belongs to the land trust, a 
long-term, set-price right of first refusal on the improvements on that land 
seems quite reasonable to courts reviewing alienation restraints.129  The fact 
that the public purpose behind the resale restrictions is to preserve affordable 
housing strengthens the enforceability of the option once the perpetuities 
concern has been eliminated. 
Because all affordability stewards wish to ensure that the property is kept 
in good condition, it is essential that the homeownership arrangement 
facilitates this goal.  In market-based owner-occupied home situations, the 
homeowner has strong financial incentives to maintain the property in good 
order to maximize his or her financial return upon resale.  CLTs can also 
structure the resale to provide this financial incentive for diligent maintenance, 
but they generally rely upon appraisals, rather than arms-length buyers, to 
judge the quality of the care.  To prevent serious waste during the term, CLTs 
have a power to intervene that is unavailable to other kinds of affordability 
stewards.130  Hopefully, neither this advantage, nor an enhanced ability to 
respond to a homeowner’s nuisance activity, will be significantly important to 
a perpetually affordable homeownership program that screens homebuyers and 
appropriately aligns incentives, but the leasehold arrangement cannot be 
matched for the potential for active stewardship.131 
The same effective leasehold CLT remedies for homeowner defaults, 
however, can contribute to a view of the leasehold homeowner as having a 
tenant rather than an owner-occupant status.  Recalling the goods associated 
with homeownership, we see that some were associated with the house as an 
investment and others with the home as a stable place within a community.  
The details of the resale formula, rather than the form of the resale restriction, 
determine the extent to which the subsidized homeowner receives the same 
return that a market homebuyer would.  The extent to which the leasehold 
 
 128.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 78. 
 130.  INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-10. 
 131. This ability to quickly respond to homeowner default may prove more useful to the core 
affordability mission in dealing with disputes over primary residency. 
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arrangement itself detracts from a CLT homeowner’s status is harder to 
identify. 
B. Preemptive Option in Reciprocal Covenants and Organizational Bylaws 
Although actual long-term affordability programs have aspects to their 
programs that draw upon the previous two approaches, the third and fourth 
types of resale restrictions predominate in current long-term subsidy retention 
programs in the United States.  Maryland’s Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit 
(MPDU) programs have favored the use of community association covenant 
declarations as the vehicles for establishing restrictions.132  As one of the 
earliest, and still leading, examples of inclusionary zoning in the United States, 
the MPDU program of Montgomery County creates subsidized affordable 
homes through large and medium-sized residential developments that are 
required by law to set aside units as affordable homeownership 
opportunities.133  The nature of these developments presupposes the creation of 
a statutory homeowners’ association and the declaration of covenants 
governing land use within the development.  The MPDU program has used this 
legal framework to establish the resale restrictions governing the subsidized 
homes within the development. 
Even though these affordable units are properly thought of as single-family 
homes owned in fee, the limited-equity housing cooperative in many ways 
serves as the model for this approach in which reciprocal covenants of 
affordability are imposed from the inception of the development.134  As with 
MPDU-regulated developments, apartment buildings developed as limited-
equity coops involve multiple units, some or all of which are income-restricted 
and placed in service more or less simultaneously.135  The resale restrictions 
generally appear in the cooperative members’ proprietary leases, their stock 
certificates and the bylaws of the cooperative.136  The enforcement of these 
affordability protections falls to the cooperative board.  With both limited-
equity cooperatives and MPDU developments, however, there are actually two 
sets of enforcers for the resale restrictions. 
Once a MPDU declaration has been recorded, the community association 
has the ability to enforce the affordability covenants.137  The covenants 
 
 132. Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 27. 
 133. Orfield, supra note 9, at 914–15. 
 134. See Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a 
Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85, 87 (2002). 
 135. Id. at 86. 
 136. David H. Kirkpatrick, Cooperatives and Mutual Housing Associations, 1 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 7, 7 (1992). 
 137. See Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 27. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] HOMES AFFORDABLE FOR GOOD 37 
authorize the local housing agency to enforce the resale provisions.138  
Likewise, cooperatives are primarily responsible for implementing their own 
resale restrictions, but they are frequently contractually obligated to preserve 
affordability also.139  These guarantees often appear in the financing 
arrangements the cooperative makes to secure its blanket mortgage.140  Both 
these systems envision affordability limitations as reciprocal arrangements like 
use restrictions.  In each case, however, the original sponsors of the subsidized 
housing do not pretend that the community of homeowners will have the same 
motivation to enforce the affordability commitments as they do when 
regulating permitted uses. 
The fundamental enforcement structures in both the cooperative and 
community association contexts provide strong resistance to invalidation under 
traditional rules against alienability restraints.  As residents and decision-
makers in a corporate landlord, cooperative members have been given broad 
latitude to constrain each other’s abilities to sell their shares.  In the less 
intimate homeowners’ association context, the interdependence of land uses 
also supports reasonable restraints on alienation.141  Despite the double-layer 
enforcement system, the fundamental orientation of the alienability restraints 
toward the interests of the other community stakeholders masks the “in gross” 
nature of the alienability restriction held by the outside entity committed to 
long-term affordability. 
The MPDU resale restrictions offer another structural accommodation to 
the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.  The duration of even the 
longest resale control periods does not exceed thirty years.142  The covenants 
used by the Frederick County MPDU program provide for a single fifteen-year 
control period starting with a unit’s initial sale.143  The Montgomery County 
program, on the other hand, not only provides for a thirty-year resale control 
period but also for the restarting of the thirty-year clock every time a unit is 
resold within its control period.144  Even though this latter approach has the 
very real potential of keeping most units permanently affordable, the MPDU 
approach to the declaration of affordability covenants supplies a date certain 
 
 138. The local housing agency is also empowered to enforce these restrictions through the 
local ordinance.  Although these restrictions run only for the first 30 years of the unit’s existence, 
this dual protection can be seen as a preemptive option arrangement backed up by a public resale 
lockbox, albeit a time-limited dedication. Id. 
 139. Kirkpatrick, supra note 134, at 7. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 29. 
 143. Id. art. III. 
 144. Id. art. II. 
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for the termination of the covenant for each buyer.  This defined time limit 
speaks directly to the second of the Restatement’s four factors.145 
By taking full advantage of the homeowners’ association structure created 
as part of the inclusionary development, the MPDU program creates a 
partnership relationship to steward the economic diversity of the community.  
Unlike the rent regulation scenario, in which the landlord and tenant each have 
financial incentives to police compliance with different aspects of the 
affordability preservation rules, the community association steward has the 
relationship to the land but lacks a clear motivation for vigilant oversight of 
resales by the residents of the affordable homeownership units.  The approach 
taken by the CLT movement is essentially to give the genuine steward of 
affordability a direct and ongoing relationship to the land.146  The ability to 
mix in affordability in existing single-family home neighborhoods requires not 
only subsidy retention but also devices that do not depend on 
contemporaneously created community governance. 
C. Preemptive Option in Stand-Alone Covenants 
Even though the inclusionary zoning covenant offers homeowners fee title 
of both land and house without sacrificing perpetual affordability, the 
reciprocal covenant option is not as viable for single-family homes developed 
in existing neighborhoods in terms of enforceability.  Vermont, a leader in the 
development of CLTs, has framed a statutory alternative to ground leasing for 
controlling resale of subsidized single-family homes.  Pursuant to a law passed 
in 1989, nonprofit developers of subsidized housing can sell properties to 
qualified homebuyers and subject them to housing subsidy covenants.147  
Although the model covenant in actual use provides for a preemptive option to 
purchase, the statute clears away all impediments to the enforceability of any 
kind of resale restriction imposed by a qualifying developer for the purpose of 
preserving affordability.  Interestingly, the Central Vermont CLT, when 
offered the opportunity to take a fully enforceable lockbox approach to 
perpetually affordable homeownership still opted for the active stewardship 
 
 145. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 146. Several urban CLTs – New Columbia CLT in Washington, DC (http://www.cdsc.org/ 
ncclt/), the Rehabilitation Action to Improve Neighborhoods (RAIN) CLT in New York City, and 
the San Francisco CLT (http://www.sfclt.org/) – are preserving affordability through cooperative 
structures.  Essentially, the cooperative keeps the individual apartments affordable and the 
community land trust ensures that the cooperative maintains its commitment to affordability, 
usually through a ground lease. 
 147. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 610 (2009). 
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model more compatible with the legal doctrines protecting freedom of 
alienability.148 
Although the statutorily prescribed stand-alone perpetual covenant would 
appear to be the perfect lockbox vehicle for permanently dedicating land to 
affordable homeownership, the recognition of the need for ongoing monitoring 
of the resale process has brought even this affordability protection device into 
the affordability stewardship fold.  As a leading commentator on shared equity 
homeownership has observed, a passive attempt to create a self-enforcing 
affordability restriction “can be a recipe for disaster.”149  This Article has 
focused on how the law related to the enforceability of such affordability 
restrictions has encouraged an active and ongoing relationship between the 
affordability steward and the land.  Other concerns, such as the compatibility 
of affordability restrictions with lender requirements, are beyond the scope of 
the current discussion but also support the need for a vigilant and sophisticated 
stewardship agent.  As the need for economic diversity among homeowners in 
localities receives greater attention, advocates and policy makers alike will 
hopefully recognize the importance of viable stewardship arrangements that 
sustain perpetually affordable homeownership. 
 
 
  
 
 148.  For information about the Central Vermont Community Land Trust’s Homeland Grant 
program, see Central Vermont Community Land Trust, Grants, http://www.cvclt.org/grants.html 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 149. Davis, supra note 53, at 70. 
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